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iDoes immigrant-origin diversity undermine states’ willingness to engage in broad social
redistribution, from enacting “living” minimum wage laws and progressive taxation, to
providing public benefits in order to mitigate economic inequality? In asking this
question, Will Kymlicka (2015), one of the staunchest defenders of multiculturalism,
takes seriously the question of whether recognition of cultural, ethnic and religious diver-
sity comes at the expense of redistribution. Not surprisingly, Kymlicka makes a strong
pitch for a multicultural welfare state, which he distinguishes from neoliberal multicultur-
alism, exclusionary welfare chauvinism or assimilatory neoliberalism1 (Kymlicka, 2015).
My own normative view – and my empirical research – is in strong support with
Kymlicka’s (2015), position on the value of combining recognition and redistribution. I
also agree with his skepticism as to whether existing data reveal any evidence that
multicultural policies generate or exacerbate welfare state retrenchment, and in his
prescription, namely, the construction of multicultural, liberal nationalism (Bloemraad,
2006; Bloemraad, 2012). Multicultural nationalism is presumably distinct from alterna-
tive national solidarities around more exclusionary, homogeneous cultural identities,
or a neoliberal, cosmopolitan approach to global membership that urges the erasure of
nationalism altogether.
Given my sympathies, this commentary is not so much a challenge to Kymlicka’s
(2015), normative argument as a social scientific appraisal of how he does not go far
enough in elaborating the mechanisms presumed to produce the progressive’s
dilemma. This is problematic, because it means that Kymlicka also does not theorize
sufficiently an answer to the question of why multicultural, liberal nationalism might
address the mechanisms that erode the welfare state in a context of diversity. I will
attempt to sketch out some possible answers and, in doing so, I will quibble with the
terminology of “solidarity” as compared to “social membership,” both terms used by
Kymlicka in his article. I engage in this definitional debate not to split hairs, but to
elucidate some silences in the redistribution/recognition trade-off that need to be
addressed moving forward. I finish by speculating how much experience with the
Canadian case, the epitome of solidarity through multicultural nationalism in the
global North, shapes (and perhaps blinds) the views of both Kymlicka and myself on
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What, exactly, is solidarity? And how does it differ from another term that Kymlicka
(2015), uses in his article, namely an ethic of “social membership”?
Kymlicka (2015), notes the virtual absence of theorizing on ‘solidarity’ outside of
sociology. Indeed, even within sociology, Kymlicka cites social theorist Jeffrey
Alexander to argue that solidarity has “disappeared” as a concept and topic. Why then
use this term? Kymlicka does not elaborate, beyond a hint that, empirically, contempor-
ary societies function based on a sense of community that goes beyond the coercion of
laws or formal institutions and, more explicitly, that a theory of equality that includes
economic justice can find the necessary “glue” for a robust welfare state through
national solidarity.
My own instinct is to feel uneasy about solidarity, and more comfortable with a
language of membership. This reaction stems, I think, from concerns about the
strength and primacy of collective obligations inherent in each term, and the openness
to multiple and even cross-cutting obligations. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, solidarity is “The fact or quality, on the part of communities, etc., of being
perfectly united or at one in some respect, esp. in interests, sympathies, or aspirations.”2
Synonyms offered by other dictionaries include unanimity, unity, harmony, cohesion and
like-mindedness.3
All of these terms are in tension with Kymlicka’s (2015), starting point: the central-
ity of democracy and, as he puts it, “facts of pluralism.” It also sits awkwardly, I feel,
with a key precept of multiculturalism, namely the recognition, valorization and
support of diversity. In contrast, membership refers to being a “constituent element
within a social or other organized structure.”4 The individual is part of a whole, but
this does not entail a ‘perfect unity’ requirement. At the same time, the notion of
membership is more than just a transactional or instrumental relationship, like two
parties agreeing to a contract. As part of a social group, relationships are implied to
extend over some time period, which can generate norms around rules, reciprocity
and even engagement in a common enterprise agreed to by members. It is, in a sense,
a thinner version of collective action than solidarity, and does not carry the same
baggage of like-mindedness.
Who deserves to be part of “us”? And why?
These semantics matter because, as scholars, we must understand the mechanisms
behind the construction of the “we” to whom we owe protection from or compen-
sation for market inequalities. Kymlicka (2015), provides a useful starting point in
his discussion of deservingness. He lists judgements about an individual’s choice or
agency in producing economic disadvantage, the sense of common identity and
belonging to a shared society, norms of reciprocity between current and future
beneficiaries, and attitudes of civic friendship. Unfortunately, Kymlicka does not
then link each of these elements to the progressive’s dilemma he began with, nor
the posited solution of liberal, multicultural nationalism on which he ends. Can
these links be made?
“Identity” is most clearly a mechanism that those worried about multiculturalism
believe reduces support for the welfare state. As more – or certain kinds – of immi-
grants enter a society, they are presumed to be seen as different by majority group
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are given benefits, to decreased social spending. Empirical support for this mechan-
ism is found in minimal group experiments in social psychology that show people
favor in-group over out-group members, and in the political rhetoric of various
political parties in the global North. But, as Kymlicka (2015), points out, despite
experimental or small-group studies supporting this mechanism – studies done in
isolation from other causal processes – social scientists have found no empirical
evidence that actual welfare state spending has decreased more in countries embra-
cing multiculturalism compared to those who eschew multiculturalism. Indeed, the
negative finding is telling: countries that have taken a hardline stance against multi-
culturalism, or immigration, have not seen a flowering of their welfare state or
dramatic increases in economic equality.
Despite the lack of empirical support, Kymlicka (2015), believes this argument has a
certain bite and, perhaps, at the force of being repeated in political rhetoric, it might
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, or feed into welfare chauvinism. The logical response,
for someone who wants to maximize justice and equality among the largest group, is to
make diversity a part of social identity. This, Kymlicka argues is precisely what has
happened in Canada, and perhaps Australia and Scotland as well.
It is less clear, however, how embracing liberal, multicultural nationalism addresses
the other mechanisms driving logics of deservingness: beliefs about choice, notions of
reciprocity or civic ‘attitude’. Critics of multiculturalism sometimes suggest that
certain immigrant groups hold cultural views or are encouraged in their cultural
isolation such that they ‘choose’ to use social programs rather than enter the labor
market (e.g., Koopmans, 2010). These arguments directly link multiculturalism to
claims that the welfare state shouldn’t support groups or individuals who choose not
to contribute (rather than who face structural problems), people who only ‘take’
rather than give (undermining reciprocity norms), and those who just don’t have the
right civic values (thus driving adoption of coercive and more homogenizing civic
integration policies). Kymlicka (2015), does not explain how cultivating multicultural
nationalism would undermine these critiques.
I do not believe that these other mechanisms, potentially linking recognition to
decreased redistribution, have been tested, but they certainly should be subject to
empirical scrutiny. Is it the case that residents of countries with stronger multicultural
identities are less likely to think that immigrants and their children are part of a
reciprocity agreement with longstanding residents, or more likely to think that those of
immigrant-origin choose welfare? Clearly articulating the mechanisms presumed to
undermine the welfare state, and carefully linking each mechanism to arguments about
diversity, will help establish an empirical agenda that allows us to evaluate such
theoretical and political claims.
Only in Canada?
Clarifying the posited causal links also raises the question of whether liberal, multi-
culturalism nationalism is possible in any developed state, or whether it is the
product of highly specific historical processes, demographic context, geographic
location and political conflicts. Put differently, is such nationalism only possible in
Canada, or a few other states?
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equality and a multicultural, liberal nationalism that generates inclusive membership in
pluralistic societies. Empirically, I agree that there is no strong evidence for a multicultur-
alism/ redistribution trade-off, and that Canada, in particular, is a positive example of
multicultural nationalism, though perhaps less a prime example of a generous redistribu-
tive welfare state. Undoubtedly, however, my views – and those of Will Kymlicka (2015),
− have been influenced by living in and studying Canada. Perhaps our understanding of
the problem and view of the solution are both biased by these experiences.
In Canada, norms of reciprocity are strongly articulated in the government’s
longstanding economic focus in immigrant entry policy. Through the Canadian
“point system,” immigrants who do not have family ties to Canadian residents nor
have pressing humanitarian reasons to migrate can apply to come to Canada based
on their purported ability to fit into the Canadian labor market and society. The
proportion of immigrants selected on economic criteria has fluctuated widely over
the last 40 years – from just over a third in 1986 to two-thirds in 2010 (Barbieri
& Ouellette, 2012) – but the Canadian government has consistently viewed immigration
as part of economic growth, whether to populate the West in the 19th century or drive
technological innovation in the 21st century. The Canadian-born are continuously told
that immigrants will help foster economic development, and help pay for the expanding
cost of an aging population.5 This rhetoric feeds into a discourse of reciprocity, and
undermines claims that immigrants’ choose to use social benefits. Debates revolve around
the question of whether immigrant unemployment or poverty is due to employers’ failure
to recognize foreign credentials, a lack of “Canadian” experience in the labor market, or
discrimination. Each argument presumes immigrants do not want to rely on the welfare
state, but are forced to do so by forces beyond their control. Given this, Canada’s success
might not just be about multiculturalism, but also immigration policy and government
discourse on immigrants.
Canadian nationalism and notions of membership also rest on the fact that Canadian
policy has long focused on permanent migration. Those who come are immigrants and
future Canadian citizens, not sojourners or temporary migrants.6 The Canadian govern-
ment, and most citizens, expects immigrants will stay, and also expect that they will
naturalize. The vast majority of immigrants appear to agree, as Canada has arguably the
highest rate of immigrant citizenship acquisition in the world (Liebig & Von Haaren,
2011). Thus Canada’s multicultural nationalism is not just about the recognition and
accommodation of diversity, but also about political and civic membership, a point that
Kymlicka (2015), mentions in passing at the end of his article.
My use of the term membership is deliberate, and brings us back to definitional debates.
But it also raises a question about our knowledge of the historical process behind nation-
building. The idea of solidarity might well entail a thicker sense of mutual obligation than
membership, which could be passive or more instrumental. But solidarity also carries the
danger of being more coercive if one needs to subsume one’s individuality to the group’s
wishes and ends. Solidarity is, I think, forged in a stronger “we” versus “them” dynamic of
conflict. Workers need solidarity in the face of powerful employers. Poles fought in
solidarity for democracy against authoritarian elites. The solidarity of English nationalism
was forged in multiple wars, and perhaps in colonialism. Empirically, can solidarity be
created without a sense of conflictual opposition?
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internal conflict and pluralism.7 Indeed, adoption of a multicultural ethos was in part the
product of political conflict in Canada, and in the United States (Bloemraad, 2015).
Extended to other countries, the path to national inclusion might need to go through civic
membership and political conflict that includes immigrant-origin minorities. Perhaps
solidarity will arise at the end, but the focus should be on the mechanisms which allow
for both recognition and redistribution.
Endnotes
1While Kymlicka relegates assimilatory neoliberalism to a footnote mid-way
through his article, I think he takes this option more seriously later in his discus-
sion of coercive civic integration policies in Europe. Some have argued that the
focus on individual responsibility to integrate culturally and be a productive worker
embodies precisely a neoliberal, assimilatory logic (Joppke, 2007; Soysal, 2012). In
the United States, while Wall Street Republicans might embrace multicultural
neoliberalism, many in the social conservative wing of the Republican party could
be labelled as neoliberal assimilationists.
2http://www.oed.com/, last accessed 6 November 2015.
3Sociologists’ biases against theories of social cohesion are thus also at times
driven by a suspicion that calls for national or broad-based solidarity are articulated
by elites or powerful actors to convince ordinary people to go to war, support a
particular interest, or overlook their lived inequalities for some greater good. See, in
this vein, Barbara Arniel’s (2006) critique of research valorizing social capital or
social cohesion in the supposed “heyday” of social capital in the United States, the
1950s, without sufficiently acknowledging how this period coincided with exclusions
and harm to ethno-racial minorities, the disabled and women. Social capital is not
the same as solidarity, but nostalgia for a time of less economic inequality, stronger
unions and political appeals to solidarity, characteristics of various Western
countries from the 1950s through to the 1970s, similarly overlaps with a time when
various groups were excluded from largely male, white, working-class movements
militating for economic equality.
4http://www.oed.com/, last accessed 6 November 2015.
5These arguments are prevalent, even in the face of evidence that high-skilled
immigrants often experience under-employment, especially in their early years in
Canada, and that immigration has a very modest effect on demographic age structures.
6The Conservative Harper governments of 2006–2015 substantially increased the
number of temporary migrant workers and seemed to have moved slightly away from
the long tradition of relying primary on permanent migration. Near the end of their
time in power, however, they were forced by public opinion, and some policy fears
that temporary migration might lead to undocumented populations, to cut back on
temporary work visas.
7This is not to say that Canada’s contemporary multicultural nationalism devel-
oped in the absence of ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamics. Far from it. It arose from an
internal conflict over federal or Quebecois nationalism between Anglophones and
Francophones, as well as external distancing that sought to distinguish Canadians
from Americans and Britons (Bloemraad, 2006; Winter, 2011).
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